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Abstract 
In this paper I will focus my attention in the distinctions embedded in standard moral 
philosophy, especially in the philosophy of Kant between, on the one hand, duty and 
supererogation on the other hand, with the aim to contrast them with the  Levinas’s 
perspective, namely his notion of infinite responsibility.  
My account of Levinas’s philosophy will show that it challenges – breaking down – 
deeply  entrenched  distinctions  in  the  dominant  strands  of  moral  philosophy,  within 
which the theory of individual responsibility is rooted. Finally, I will argue that the 
notion of infinite responsibility to the Other could be viewed as an attempt to create an 
ethics, based on secular saintliness/holiness with individual and social consequences in 
our daily life. 













 Infinite Responsibility: An expression of Saintliness 
 
The concept of infinite responsibility is bound to be extremely problematic to any one 
immersed within the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition which defines the dominant 
conception of (individual) responsibility, both in morals and in law. The moral/political 
philosophers working within that framework have tended to ignore it. However, Richard 
Rorty, though not normally seen as a moral philosopher, does refer to it, but only to 
dismiss it in a few lines.
1 For this reason it is necessary to address certain criticisms, 
which could be directed against Levinas notion of infinite responsibility.
2  
   
    1. Supererogation and Kantian Ethics
3 
Entrenched in standard moral philosophy, is the distinction between duty on the one 
hand and supererogation on the other. While it is morally obligatory to perform the 
former,  it  is  not  morally  obligatory,  though  morally  laudable,  to  perform  the  other. 
Those who engage in it are honoured with the label of moral ‘heroes’ or ‘heroines’ who 
have sacrificed themselves for the good of others. They are the ‘good samaritans’, those 
who have gone beyond duty to help others while putting themselves out or exposing 
                                                 
1 See Richard, Rorty, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1995) 96-97; it would be cited later on. 
2 This very limited attempt to defend Levinas must be taken in the spirit in which it is made, that is to say, 
totally independent of what Levinas himself might or might not have said, should he so wish to defend 
himself, of whether he might approve of this kind of exercise on his behalf. For a different kind of 
criticism  than  the  sort  raised  here,  see  Michael  Haar,  “The  Obsession  of  the  Other:  Ethics  as 
Traumatization” , Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol.23 (6), (1997). 
3 In this discussion the term,  “Kantian Ethics” is used to  refer to that ethical perspective in  modern 
Western moral thought which has been influenced by Kant’s ethical theory, and not necessarily uniquely 




themselves to considerable or great risks of danger. They are considered in that sense to 
be ‘abnormal’, thereby creating the distinction between ‘normal’ moral agents who are 
in the majority and ‘abnormal’ ones who tend to be in the minority. 
    Increasingly over the last twenty years or so, in Britain, in any case, that number 
seems to be diminishing, judging by anecdotal accounts and news reports. For instance, 
a local free sheet in Manchester (The Reporter, 14 November 2002) carried a news item 
about an eighty-year old grandmother who was badly mugged by some teenaged girls 
while walking along a suburban street in the early evening; she appealed to a male 
passer-by for help who refused and walked away.
4 On the other hand, history of the 
second half of the twentieth century provides some sublime examples of supererogation. 
For  instance,  some  gentiles in  Nazi-occupied  Europe  risked  their  very  lives  to  hide 
and/or help Jewish people, whether neighbours or total strangers, to escape to safety.
5 
    However, much as one might praise or be moved to tears by such noble efforts of 
samaritanism, and much as one might lament or be upset by the lack of the samaritan 
spirit in more mundane instances where the effort and risk incurred in helping someone 
                                                 
4 The decline of good samaritans in the UK could be put down to a variety of reasons: the feeling that it is 
often not safe to intervene, as one could be involved with violent behaviour, or that it would be futile to 
try to subdue some one potentially violent when other by-standers are not equally willing to join in to 
tackle the aggressor; owing to the change in ideological climate since 1979, more people than before tend 
to believe that rational egoism is the best policy to adopt – one turns away and leaves well alone whatever 
does not immediately affect one’s own interests; in a society where the spirit of litigation is rapidly being 
entrenched, one could even be sued for whatever damage one might unwittingly cause to another in one’s 
effort to help the  victim.  As a result, one  finds today in Britain a greater reluctance to act as good 
samaritans  even  if  the  act  involves  little  effort  or  risk,  such  as  helping  the  mugged  grandmother  in 
question. 





in distress or danger is  no more than some inconvenience to those on  the scene, it 
remains the case that both forms of samaritanism, mundane or sublime, are regarded as 
forms of supererogation within the dominant (Western) tradition of moral philosophy. 
There is just no moral duty to carry them out.
6 Yet Levinas’s emphasis on responsibility 
for the Other implies the abolition of the deep-seated distinction between duty on the 
one  hand  and  supererogation  on  the  other.  That  is  why  Levinas’s  conception  of 
responsibility  is  said  to  be  infinite  responsibility,  and  also,  therefore,  considered  as 
unintelligible  to  those  who  adhere  to  the  dominant  conception  of  responsibility  in 
western  moral  thought,  such  as  Rorty.  On  the  standard  understanding  of  morality, 
failure to carry out a moral duty is morally reprehensible and in legal contexts, justifies 
                                                 
6 However, if it is argued that these are not acts of supererogation but duties to others – that one is simply 
mistaken in holding that they are acts of supererogation – then the concept of supererogation runs the 
danger of being an empty category. What acts could possibly count as those of supererogation if not these? 
It would be incumbent on such critics to provide “genuine” instances of supererogation, to show how 
these differ significantly from the examples cited here, especially those which involve a very real risk of 
life to the “do-gooder”. In the absence of convincing arguments to make their point, one would be entitled 
to conclude that the concept of supererogation has been rendered null and void. Yet if these critics regard 
themselves  as  Kantian  (as  opposed  to  being  utilitarian)  in  spirit  and  outlook,  then  they  would  have 
undermined their own standpoint. However, this criticism would not apply if the would-be critics are 
utilitarians, as the utilitarian tradition does not need to recognise the distinction between duty on the one 
hand and supererogation on the other – for them, whether one has a duty in any one instance depends 
entirely on  good consequences outweighing bad ones overall. In the case of  saving  Jews  from Nazi 
persecution, if one were to do a utilitarian calculation, it would probably turn out in some instances that 
overall, bad rather than good consequences would ensue; in the majority of instances, it would be very 
difficult even to envisage what the consequences could be given the extreme uncertainties surrounding 
the dilemma; and probably in a few cases, it might be possible to say definitively that good consequences 




the infliction of an appropriate penalty;
7 failure to carry out a supererogatory act, while 
still attracting some mild reprobation especially in instances where only inconvenience 
would  be  incurred  in  discharging  such  an  act,  is  not  regarded  to  be  morally 
reprehensible  in  the  way  that  failure  to  carry  out  a  moral  duty  attracts  moral/legal 
disapproval. On the other hand, to engage in such an act (whether minor or major) earns 
the agent moral praise and honour, as already mentioned. The Levinasian conception of 
responsibility forces one to look at this asymmetry anew.  
    From  his  perspective  as  interpreted  here,  it  would  be  incoherent  to  draw  a 
boundary between those acts which constitutes duties to others and those which are less 
than duties to others when in either instance, one’s effort could end with the same result, 
namely, preventing harm to another. The aim of not laying a trap in the dark for another 
is precisely the same as the aim of getting medical help to another seriously injured by 
falling into such a trap; yet (a) why should the former constitute a duty and the latter a 
mere supererogation? (b) why suffer moral unease when there is failure to help another 
in distress, unless the failure to do so constitutes an act which hurts or injures another? 
      To raise questions like the above is to draw attention to the ‘thinness’ of the 
moral universe purveyed by the dominant account of responsibility. ‘Thinness’ here 
refers to the absolute minimum amount of moral engagement between human beings, 
which is necessary for society to cohere and to exist.  To draw the boundary between 
self and others in this way would ensure minimal overlap and, hence, the maximal space 
                                                 
7 Note that in law (English law, at least), the general public has no legal obligation to assist another who 
is in distress. For example, in a swimming pool, one is not legally obliged to save someone who is 
drowning; however, the poolside supervisor/monitor does have a legal duty to save the drowning person, 
and should he fail to do so, that act of omission would amount to criminal negligence and render him 




for the self to operate and to ‘do its own thing’, protected, as much as possible, from 
being tangled with the lives of others. 
      It may be fair to say that modern Western ethical thought has focused, perhaps 
unfairly so to Kant’s own complex thoughts, on the so-called notion of perfect duties to 
others.
8 We shall see why in a moment. To greatly simplify matters, Kant may be said 
to use two sets of distinction – perfect/imperfect duties on the one hand and duties to 
self/to others on the other – thereby creating four categories of duties: perfect duty to 
self (such as the duty not to commit suicide), imperfect duty to self (duty to develop and 
realise one’s own potential), perfect duties to others (duties not to kill, maim or damage 
others,  bodily  and  economically),  imperfect  duties  to  others  (duty  to  help  others  to 
thrive and flourish).
9 Kant’s efforts to clarify the Categorical Imperative, embedded in 
his philosophy of freedom through its various formulations, is complicated, not easy to 
set out briefly and is not without problems.
10 In moral deliberation, one must adopt the 
standpoint of a rational agent, and in so doing, arrive at an imperative which in turn 
applies universally to all rational beings. 
                                                 
8 This point is an important one to emphasise here. First of all, this very brief discussion of Kant’s moral 
philosophy in terms of the Categorical Imperative and of duties is not meant to be, as it necessarily cannot 
be, thorough, systematic or exhaustive. 
9 For a recent thorough discussion of the detailed complexities of Kant’s moral philosophy, see Roger, J. 
Sullivan, Immanuel Kan’s Moral Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and for an 
anthology of essays on the subject, see Ruth Chadwick, (ed), Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy – 
Immanuel Kant: Critical Assessments, (London: Routledge, 1992). 
10 See Sullivan, Immanuel Kan’s Moral Theory for a shorter account, see Roger, Scruton, Kant, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1952) pp 58-77; for a more critical account, see Ralph, C.S. Walker, Kant: The 




      In  other  words,  reason  dictates  –  according  to  the  first  formulation  of  the 
Categorical Imperative – that in deciding to act to carry out an end, the agent must act 
only  on  that  maxim  which  when  universalised  would  not  involve  the  agent  in  a 
contradiction, that is, a maxim which one can will as a universal law – “Act as if the 
maxim  of  your  action  were  to  become  by  your  will  a  universal  law  of  nature.”
11  
Although the maxim is formal, yet far from being devoid of practical implications and 
content, it is commonly understood to yield very concrete injunctions, such as one has a 
duty not to break promises. Contradiction is involved as follows: 
(a) To  be  a  moral  law,  the  maxim  which  forbids  promise-breaking,  must  be 
universally binding. 
(b) Should I wish to act against this moral law, such as to break a promise whenever 
it is to my advantage to do so, I would be making an exception of myself to the 
law. 
(c) Yet, in granting this exception to myself, I must grant it to all others, as every 
moral agent, including myself, is a rational agent, 
(d) But if every rational agent were to act as I do, that is, to make an exception of 
him/herself  to  the  moral  law,  the  institution  of  promise  breaking  will  be 
undermined or abolished. 
(e) Hence, I cannot universalise the maxim of my action – keep promises if and 
only if my own interests are advanced – without contradiction. 
(f)  And hence, the maxim – always keep promises – is universally binding, and 
therefore a moral law. 
                                                 
11 I, Kant,  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 




  However, while it is relatively easy to justify this example of perfect duties to 
others under the first formulation, it does not seem to work quite so readily in the case 
of Kant’s prohibition of suicide – perfect duty to self – as an instantiation of it. No 
contradiction appears to be involved in the same way as a contradiction is shown to be 
involved in the maxim about promise breaking, as set out in the note earlier. Suppose I 
will that I and every rational agent such as myself commit suicide. What would happen 
is that the whole of humanity would probably be wiped out (save those who do not 
qualify to be rational agents, such as the infantile and the very senile in mind). Absurd 
as  the  implication  of  such  a  universal  maxim  might  be,  no  contradiction  has  been 
committed in proposing it. Absurdity may be a departure from rationality in some other 
sense of the term but it does not amount to a contradiction in this context. Furthermore, 
Kant has not given any other characterisation of the concept of rationality, save relying 
on  its  strongest  form,  namely,  the  principle  of  non-contradiction.  So  Kant  has  not 
demonstrated that prohibition against suicide is a moral law, and therefore, that suicide 
is invariably morally wrong. In any case, rational beings are more likely to propose a 
more nuanced maxim, such as: I will that I and rational agents like myself who are 
incurably/terminally ill and in extreme pain commit suicide or be assisted to do so. Kant 
might  claim  that  there  is  a  contradiction  involved  here,  namely,  that  one  would  be 
committing oneself to the pursuit of happiness and at the same time to steps, which 
would render its further pursuit impossible. But such an attempt does not sound very 
convincing – happiness, after all, might well be found under these circumstances in 
what might be called a ‘good death’, a death of which the rational agent is in full control, 
in  full  exercise  of  his/her  autonomy.  Such  a  maxim  does  not  sanction suicide  ‘tout 
court’ but suicide under certain specific circumstances only. However, Kant’s aim is to 




one  could  say  that  Kant’s  formal  use  of  rationality  (via  the  principle  of  non-
contradiction) is not sufficient here to generate a substantive norm of conduct. 
  Similarly, Kant’s treatment of imperfect duty to self suffers from the same weakness. 
The maxim: “Let everyone neglect his talents” is perfectly universal. It might not be 
rational to will it as a moral law but not in the sense that as a universal maxim, it 
embodies outright contradictions. Furthermore, to say that one cannot (rationally) will 
to  neglect  one’s  talents  since  as  a  rational  being  one  necessarily  will  that  all  one’s 
power’s be developed is unconvincing – the utterance amounts to a tautology unless 
further content were given to what is meant by ‘rational being’, ‘necessarily will’.  
   However,  Kant’s  category  of  imperfect  duty  to others  is  more  amenable  to  the 
treatment  he  has  in  mind.  The  maxim:  “Let  no  one  ever  help  anyone  else”  is  also 
universal. The contradiction amounts to this: 
(a) All  rational  agents,  myself  included,  necessarily  will  our  own  individual 
happiness. 
(b) All rational agents, myself included, also necessarily will the means to achieve 
our respective ends. 
(c) All rational agents, myself included, sometimes require the help of others and, 
thereby, necessarily will their help on such occasions. 
(d) “Let  no  one  ever  help  anyone  else”  is,  therefore,  incompatible  with  the 
conjunction: (a), (b) and (c). 
        This could be one reason why the category of perfect duties to others (which 
could, by and large, be translated into negative duties of the kind commonly formulated 
in terms of “thou shall not kill”, “thou shall not steal”, “thou shall not lie or break 
promises” etc.) receives more attention than the other three categories, in spite of the 




duties to others (as shown in the preceding note) than the remaining two categories of 
duties to self.
12   
      Kant’s notion of rationality, autonomy and freedom implies that every rational 
agent is “an end in himself”, according to his second formulation – “So act that you use 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same 
time as an end, never merely as a means.”
13 In other words, one must treat all rational 
agents never simply as means to one’s own ends, but as ends in themselves. 
      As the first formulation has shown, the moral agent must regard the moral law as 
something  universally  legislated  and  binding;  this  point  is  reinforced  in  the  third 
formulation, namely, that the will of every rational agent is “a universally legislative 
will”  involving  a  “kingdom  of  ends”  to  which  every  agent  subscribes  in  acting 
autonomously. It is sometimes formulated as follows: “Act as if you were through your 
maxims a legislating member of a Kingdom of Ends”
14 the original passage in Kant 
reads: “The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as giving 
universal law through all the maxims of his will, so as to appraise himself and his 
actions from this point  of view, leads to a very fruitful  concept dependent upon it, 
namely that of a kingdom of ends.”
15  
                                                 
12 That is why Kant’s first formulation of the Categorical Imperative is said to provide the philosophical 
basis for the Golden Rule – do unto others what you would wish others to do unto you. See Sir David 
Ross, Kant´s Ethical Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954) pp. 44-45; Scruton, Kant, p. 70. 
For an alternative interpretation, see Sullivan, Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 204. 
13 I, Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,1997) 1997, 4:429,38. 
14 Walker 1987, 158. 




      As I have just mentioned, the first formulation seems to fit best the category of 
perfect duties to others. The second formulation underpins Kant’s notion of ‘persons’ as 
opposed to ‘things’ – while the latter is not rational, autonomous and free, the former is 
category is eminently so. Kant writes: 
  
Beings the existence of which rests not on our will but on nature, if they are beings without 
reason, still have only a relative worth, as a means, and are therefore called things, whereas 
rational beings are called persons because their nature already marks them out as an end in 
itself, that is, as something that may not be used merely as a means, and hence so far limits 
all choice (and is an object of respect).
16  
 
This in turn serves to lay the foundation of the concept of right. Persons who come 
under the aegis of the Categorical Imperative are those beings who have rights to whom 
we owe duties. Respect for persons and rights go hand in hand, leading once again to an 
implied emphasis on the category of perfect duties to others. 
      In this light, the Kantian influence in shaping modern Western moral thought 
seems to have been confined to an emphasis on rights and respect as well as on the 
notion  of  perfect  duties  to  others.  This  in  turn  may  have  led  to  a  de-emphasis  on 
benevolence,  which  may  have  been  reinforced  by  Kant’s  privileging  reason  over 
passion. Benevolence is a sentiment or inclination, which may or may not reside in any 
one person on any one occasion. To act out of benevolence appears to be a chancy 
affair, depending on mood and circumstance. In any case, mere inclination or passion 
has no particular moral worth; moral worth lies in the ability of the rational human 
agent to resist inclination to which he/she is also prey – “It is a very beautiful thing to 
do good to men from love to them and from sympathetic goodwill, or to be just from 
                                                 




love of order, but this is not the true moral maxim.”
17 Thus the desire to live is mere 
instinct; however, the desire to continue to live in spite of all the odds, out of duty, not 
to commit suicide, constitutes moral worth.
18  
    Furthermore, while Kant emphasises that one may not refuse to help others in 
need  in  so  far  as  one  can  do  so,  that  one  may not  in  general  be  indifferent  to  the 
happiness of others, nevertheless, he is of the opinion that these moral duties need have 
no  juridical  counterparts.
19 In  other  words,  he  seems  to  imply  that  while  they  are 
morally laudable and even obligatory, and, indeed, that one should actively cultivate 
“love” of others – “moral love” in the sense that one ought to feel genuinely benevolent 
to others irrespective of whether one likes them or cares for them personally  – the 
relevant realm of their operation is inter-personal conduct between individuals, and not 
in the public domain, either civic/national and international.
20 However, as we shall see 
a  little  later,  western  societies  of  late  on  the  whole  have  opted  to  recognise  in  law 
certain  minimum  obligations  to  secure  the  welfare  of  all  its  citizens;  however,  for 
societies/governments to recognise that similar  obligations to others in  need outside 
their national boundaries is more difficult to secure.  
   
  2. Supererogation and Common Sense Morality 
However, at this point of the argument, I need to introduce a new element to complicate 
the picture so far outlined, which might further explain why it  appears difficult for 
                                                 
17 I, Kant Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary Gregor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1997b), 249. 
18 See, for example, Scruton, Kant, p. 74. 
19 Following Sullivan, Immanuel Kant’s Theory, p. 71. 
20 On Kant’s emphasis on moral love, see Sullivan, Immanuel Kant’s Theory pp. 205-6. This then means 




societies to recognise obligations to those in need outside their national boundaries. The 
major  (philosophical)  normative  systems  which  have  informed  and  defined  modern 
Western moral thought, namely, the Kantian, the liberal and (to some extent also) the 
utilitarian traditions, all of which in principle are universalising ethics excluded certain 
groups and certain kinds of actions. For the first, the Categorical Imperative applies to 
all those human beings who count as persons; for the second, the liberal principle is 
applicable to all normal adult human beings whose rational faculty could be assumed to 
be  properly  developed;  for  the  third,  the  principle  of  utility  covers  all  those  beings 
(theoretically including non-human ones, but in practice in the main applied to humans 
only) who can suffer pain. However, in reality, historically and in political terms, their 
universalising  aspect  has  not  always  been  applied  to  those  who  may  qualify  in 
philosophical terms for consideration under their respective rubrics; given the historical 
and cultural differences between groups and societies, those who have been (or are) 
excluded have been (or are) perceived to be different from those included. 
    It appears that at the same time, in practice, these major traditions, within which 
the  notion  of  individual  responsibility  is  philosophically  embedded,  have  also  been 
checked by another current in modern Western society, which subscribes not so much to 
a universalising approach to ethics, as to a much older conception of duties to others, 
which  may  be  called  ‘concentric’. 
21 By  this  is  meant,  that  duties  to  one’s  family 
                                                 
21 The combination of the historically and culturally determined limitations in the application of the major 
universalising ethics may be seen in the following examples. For example, Kantian ethics took a rather 
long time indeed in modern Western societies to break through the concentric circle of males as far as 
voting  was concerned, although it is clear that normal adult  women do qualify to be persons in the 
Kantian sense of the term. Mill withheld the application of his liberal principle from the working classes 
of his day on the grounds that their rational faculty was under-developed owing to their lack of education. 




constitute the innermost circle, and therefore, the most compelling; then to people who 
live within the national jurisdiction; then to so-called ‘kith and kin’ in the diaspora. In 
the  past,  the  family  usually  included  three  generations,  children,  parents  and  grand 
parents. However, to day, the pattern has changed in the advanced industrial countries in 
the West and even elsewhere. In the past, duties to elderly parents were considered quite 
as compelling as duties to children and to husband/wives. Today, duties to the former 
are construed so minimally as to be virtually non-existent; a good many may still have 
the residual feeling that they should get in touch a few times a year with their elderly 
parents or grand parents, such as on birthdays and at Christmas. The care of the elderly 
increasingly is no longer the responsibility of the immediate family but of institutions, 
whether paid for by the state or by the individual. The family increasingly is construed 
as the nuclear family – not only has the notion shrunk in scope and size but also has 
come, in some cases, to be regarded as a temporal thing which endures only until the 
children  obtain  the  age  of  majority.
22   On  the  hand,  recent  developments  on  the 
environmental front have forced society and some theorists to consider the problem of 
                                                                                                                                               
of slaves, but subject to orderly utilitarian requirements – that is to say, free your slaves and as many of 
them  at  any  one  time  as  was  compatible  with  security,  order,  and  indeed,  economic  contingencies. 
Although the formal act of emancipation occurred in the USA nearly two centuries ago, it remains true 
that even to this day, by and large, African Americans are still at a disadvantage in numerous spheres of 
life compared to their compatriots, in general, of European descent.  
22 One in three marriages in the UK, today, ends in divorce or separation. Some divorced parents even 
take the view that their duties to their offspring are at best confined to financial support only. However, 
the rate of re-marriage following divorce is also high. In this sense, a new kind of extended family has 
taken the place of the old; but the duties to step children are not in general construed to be as compelling 




duties to posterity and to debate the issue whether present generations owe obligations 
to future generations.
23  
      As already mentioned, people, on the whole, recognise, one’s moral and legal 
(minimum) obligations to others, especially fellow citizens, who live within the national 
jurisdiction, although many are none too keen to see too much of their taxes diverted to 
support services which are universally open to all or to those in need. However, with 
regard to people, outside one’s national boundaries, no matter how needy, there is even 
less  moral  enthusiasm  in  general  to  divert  taxes  to  help  support  them.  Some 
governments may have set the laudable goal of devoting 1% - 2% of their GNP to 
foreign  aid,  but  very  few  ever  reach  it.  The  UN  is  trying  again;  its  Millenium 
Development Goals was adopted by the General Assembly in September 2000.
24 This 
attitude has been (or is) regarded as normal because traditionally all societies make a 
distinction between kith and kin on the one hand and total strangers on the other.
25 To 
                                                 
23  See,  for  instance,  Avner,  De-Shalit,  Why  Posterity  Matters:  Environment  Policies  and  Future 
Generations(London: Routledge, 1992). 
The minimum time span is generally agreed to be a hundred years. It is difficult today to work out how 
many generations would occur over a period of a hundred years, as the pattern of child-bearing has 
altered so dramatically of late, especially now with medically-assisted reproduction of one kind or another 
in place. 
24 Larry Elliott, “A Bond with the Poor of the World”, The Guardian, (16 December, 2002, 21). See UN’s 
Millennium  Development  Goals  (2000).  See  also  the  Pre-Budget  Report  of  the  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer, UK (2002). Gordon Brown has proposed to the G7 countries, the IMF and the World Bank, in 
the name of global justice, to double international aid to $100 billion dollars between 2002 and 2015 in 
order to meet the UN’s millennium development goals. For an account of the mechanisms which Brown 
hopes to rely on to achieve the goal he has set out. 
25 In some tribal societies in the past, not only was there no duty to help strangers in distress, there is, on 




the former in distant lands, one owes duties to help under certain circumstances, but to 
the latter, who do not share one’s language/culture/history, one owes no such things. 
However, today, when the television brings instant images of want and suffering into 
one’s living room, when man-made changes in climatic and other conditions are global 
in character, when economic relations between nations are increasingly drawn into a 
complicated  world-wide  network  under  the  aegis  of  globalisation,  etc.,  a  change  in 
attitude  is  being  set  in  motion  by  certain  individuals,  NGOs,  and  even  some 
governments to expand the notion of duties to others to include people in need who live 
outside  one’s  national  jurisdiction  and  who  may  not  share  one’s 
language/culture/history.
26 
      In other words, in today’s culture, it remains on the whole to be the case that 
while one may be said to have some moral obligations to the needy who live in one’s 
jurisdiction, who are one’s kith and kin, who share one’s history, language and culture, 
etc., one has no such duties to those who are outside these boundaries. At best it would 
                                                 
26 Sarah, Boseley, “Cost-price Drugs Plan for Poor Countries”, The Guardian, (28 December, 2002). The 
UK government in November 2002 announced a plan for a two-tier system for drug pricing which would 
make essential drugs available to the poor countries at cost price while the developed countries continue 
to pay for them at the rate charged by pharmaceutical companies. However, Clare Short’s – Minister for 
International Development – initiative was/is expected to run into opposition from the US government 
and its pharmaceutical lobby. And it has; in the month following, Dick Cheney, the US vice-president, at 
the WTO talks in Geneva ruled out a deal which would have allowed a full range of life-saving drugs to 
be imported into Africa, Asia and Latin America at cut-price costs. Acting at the behest of the drug 
companies, he wants to impose the narrowest possible interpretation of the Doha Declaration, and to 
confine price reduction only to drugs dealing with HIV/Aids, malaria, TB and a few other diseases unique 
to Africa but for which the drug companies do little or no research – see Elliott, “A Bond with the Poor of 
the World” and Charlotte, Denny, “Bush Blocks Deal Allowing Cheap Drugs for the World’s poor” The 




be laudable to help such others, but that would be an act of supererogation and not duty. 
Given this orientation, it is convenient, on the whole, for affluent Western societies to 
leave the job of satisfying the needs of the poor and the sick living in the world’s less 
developed  economies  to  those  who  desire  to  perform  acts  of  supererogation  by 
supporting international non-governmental organisations such as Oxfam and Médecins 
sans Frontières 
    I  have  now  briefly  unpicked  some  of  the  strands  which  make  up  the  moral 
consciousness and conscience in general in today’s Western societies, traced some of 
them back to what may be called a sub-conscious selective borrowing, probably, of 
certain aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy, reinforced by certain elements in so-called 
common sense morality, which may be said to make it easy for theorists to dismiss out 
of hand Levinas’s notion of infinite responsibility for others. His notion is infinite for 
precisely the reasons already set out, that is to say, he rejects the distinction between 
family/kith  and  kin  on  the  one  hand  and  strangers  on  the  other,  between  so-called 
perfect duties on the one hand and imperfect duties on the other, between (as Kant 
would  understand  it)  reason  on  the  one  hand  and  inclination/passion  on  the  other, 
between duty on the one hand and supererogation on the other, and thus he also rejects 
the asymmetry between moral praise for acts of supererogation on the one hand while 
withholding moral condemnation for failure to carry out such acts on the other. For 
Levinas, it appears that each and every one has one supreme duty, and that is, always to 
be responsible for others, to act out of benevolence to others. As we have seen, ethics as 
first philosophy for Levinas tolerates no exclusion – our moral duties are not confined to 





  3. Saintliness/Holiness or Moral Perfection: Is It So Absurd? 
In the following exchange, Levinas raises the notion of saintliness. 
 
Question: The self, as the ethical subject, is responsible for everything and everyone; 
one’s responsibility is infinite. Is not this situation non-viable for the subject itself as well 
as for the other as I risk to terrorise it by my ethical will? Is there not then an ethical 
impotence in the will to do good? 
Levinas:  I  do  not  know  if  the  situation  is  non-viable.  It  is  not  what  one  would  call 
agreeable, certainly, it may not be pleasant, but it is the good. What is very important – I 
am able to support that without being myself a saint, nor do I pass myself off as a saint – 
it is the ability to say that the notion of being truly human, in the European sense of the 
term, comes from the Greeks and the Bible, and which understands saintliness as the 
ultimate value, as the unquestioned value. Sure, it is very difficult to preach that; it does 
not  go  down  well  to  preach  it  and  to  do  so  may  well  incur  the  scorn  of  society  as 
presently evolved.
27  
Supererogation may be said to be an aspect of ‘saintliness’. As shown earlier, while acts 
of supererogation/saintliness may be laudable, all the same, these notions are not part 
and  parcel  of  morality  or  moral  thinking  as  commonly  practised  or  understood  in 
modern Western societies. They do not constitute moral duties as such. To aspire to 
such sublime moral heights is perfectly laudable from the point of view of cultivating 
moral virtue or perfection in one’s character; but it implies that not all moral agents are 
expected to follow such a path. It is analogous to the attitude of the Roman Catholic 
Church, at least in the past, to the religious vocation. While exhorting its young to enter 
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the religious life, to embrace the vows of chastity, poverty and obedience, nevertheless, 
the Church is well aware that not every one is capable of being called or of following 
such a calling – those, who do, are honoured, but those, who do not, are neither blamed 
nor censured. 
    Saintliness or holiness is, therefore, a private calling for the few. Furthermore, to 
try to practise it outside the domain of the personal and the individual is a sign of 
obtuseness and inaptitude, which would produce more bad than good – after all, the way 
to hell is paved with good intentions. Such a spirit is behind the brisk dismissal by Rorty 
of Levinas: 
 
The notion of ‘infinite responsibility’ formulated by Emmanuel Levinas and sometimes 
deployed by Derrida … may be useful to some of us in an individual quest for private 
perfection. When we take up our public responsibilities, however, the infinite and the 
unrepresentable are merely nuisances. Thinking of our responsibilities in these terms is 
as much of a stumbling-block to effective political organization as is the sense of sin.
28 
 
But is saintliness/supererogation as moral perfection such a useless or unhelpful notion 
in public political life?  
      To  make  sense  of  the  notion  of  saintliness  or  moral  perfection,  one  should 
simply regard it as an ideal towards which we ought to aspire and to execute in practice 
as much as it is possible in both the personal and the public domains. (However, for the 
purpose in hand, only the public domain will be looked at.) Such an enterprise is neither 
inherently  absurd  nor  unsound  in  practice.  In  political  philosophy  proper,  similar 
disdain is expressed about utopias and the idea of utopianism itself, although it does not 
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prevent  a  massive  literature  on  the  subject  from  building  up  over  the  centuries  by 
theorists  all  over  the  world.
29 It  is  true  that  utopias  when  put  into  practice  have  in 
general failed, and in some cases become distinctly distopian in character. But from this, 
one  cannot  simplistically  infer  that  the  very  attempt  to  formulate  it  is  either 
unintelligible or has no worth. The idea of utopia is analogous to the notion of truth in 
epistemology. Many epistemologists, too, have argued that the notion of truth is either 
incoherent and/or unachievable; however, that has not prevented other philosophers as 
well as scientists (of the natural world) from hanging on to some version of it, arguing 
that it is nevertheless indispensable in any attempt to give an  account of the world 
around us. One very influential philosopher of science, Karl Popper, has talked about 
verisimilitude  or  approximation  to  truth  as  an  indispensable  epistemological  goal  in 
scientific theorising – even if we would never know the whole truth or know that we 
know the (whole) truth, nevertheless, it makes sense for us to strive to get at the truth 
and to say that one theory is closer to the truth than other, and in this way arrive at least 
at some truths, though necessarily partial.
30 
      In the same way, one must have ideals, some of which are captured in utopian 
thought,  to  inform  our  social  and  political  visions,  or  public  life  would  be  very 
impoverished indeed. Utopian ideals play the important role of providing a focus for a 
                                                 
29 Just to cite one limited example of the volume of work in this genre which is confined to one country 
alone in the course of only a hundred and fifty years of its history, see Gregory, Claeys, (ed), Modern 
British  Utopias,  1700-1850,  (London:  Pickering,  1987)  8  vols.  For  recent  critical  assessments,  see 
Krishan, Kumar, Utopianism; Aurel, Kolnai, The Utopian Mind and Other Papers: A critical Study in 
Moral and Political Philosophy, (London: Athlone Press, 1995).  
30 K, Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, (London:Routledge, 1969). See also T. S. Kuhn, The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). Kuhn, whether rightly or wrongly, 




critique of extant society. In their absence, no truly radical criticism and departure from 
the ‘status quo’ would be feasible. Utopias in concrete may be transient or be corrupted 
in practice, yet they appear to have the habit of leaving residues behind, with a kind of 
underground  life,  slowly  permeating  through  the  public  consciousness  eventfully  to 
make itself felt, though not in the form envisaged by the utopian author himself. Take 
Charles Fourier (1772-1837) and his utopian vision as an example.
31 Those set up in 
America in his name did not last long, it is true, yet his idea of sexual emancipation for 
both men and women from what he saw as the unhealthy repression of sexuality on the 
part of Christianity – a crucial element of his social/political philosophy – finally only 
became accepted and mainstream in the 1960s.
32 In this sense, many so-called utopian 
ideas are only utopian because they are well ahead of their time, so much so that their 
contemporaries often, if not invariably, regarded their originators to be insane, a fate 
which  Fourier  suffered.  In  other  words,  in  many  instances,  an  ideal  written  off  as 
utopian is simply one which has been enunciated before its time, and whose unwitting 
role seems then to be that of preparing the ground for its later reception. What appeared 
at first to be highly idealistic, in the sense of being impractical and unlikely to have 
mass appeal, becomes ultimately accepted by society in general and even commonplace. 
Like truth or approximation to it which acts as epistemological guide to the eventual 
emergence of theories which are more true than false, analogously, society informed by 
certain utopian ideals may be able to inch towards them, perhaps never fully achieving, 
though often successful eventually in partially instantiating them.  
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    It is probably in a similar fashion that Levinas himself understands his notion of 
infinite responsibility for the Other. In an interview in 1988, he was reported to say: 
 
That is the great separation that there is between the way the world functions concretely 
and the ideal of saintliness of which I am speaking. And I maintain that this ideal of 
saintliness is presupposed in all our value judgements. … There is a utopian moment in 
what I say; it is the recognition of something  which cannot be realized but which, 
ultimately,  guides  all  moral  action.  ... There  is  no  moral  life  without  utopianism  – 
utopianism in this exact sense that saintliness is goodness.
33  
 
Perhaps the moment for the utopian ideal of saintliness or moral perfection in the form 
of Levinas’s notion of infinite responsibility to bear some fruit is about to arrive in the 
public domain, both nationally and internationally. 
    The  transition  to  practical  implementation  could  perhaps  even  be  eased  by  a 
proposal to pare down the notion a little without undermining its essence.  To see how 
this could be done, let us take a look at utilitarianism and a particular criticism often 
raised against it. Its over-arching value is to maximise pleasure/happiness on the one 
hand and to minimise pain on the other – the former may be referred to as positive and 
the latter as negative utilitarianism.
34 The positive version is said to be unworkable for 
the simple reason that the notion of happiness or pleasure is considered to be slippery. 
After all, one person’s pleasure is another person’s poison; furthermore, one person 
may derive intense but another only mild pleasure from the same activity. Worse, the 
pursuit of happiness is elusive – upon achieving it, it seems to evaporate. Hence the 
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and D. Wood (eds), The Provocation of Levinas, (New York: Routledge, 1988), 177-78. 
34 For a discussion of this issue, see Karl, Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, (London: Routledge, 




goal of maximising pleasure in society is inoperable.
35 The negative version, however, 
does  not  suffer  from  these  criticisms.
36 Although  we  may  have  no  idea  about  what 
makes people happy, we have a much clearer idea as to what makes people miserable – 
to suffer from hunger, cold, great heat or thirst, to have no roof over the head, to endure 
(severe and sustained) pain from illness and disease, etc.
37 To minimise pain/suffering 
constitutes  a  coherent  social  vision,  sufficient  to  generate  a  consensus  as  guide  to 
policy-making in the public domain. If policy A adversely affects x number of people, 
yielding n units of pain, while policy B affects 10x adversely, yielding 10n units of 
pain, then choose policy A over B. 
                                                 
35 One standard retort is to say that these criticisms are beside the point. One can ignore them by simply 
asking those who would be affected by a particular policy (over an alternative) how much pleasure (along 
a scale) each would derive, and add up all the units of pleasure to determine which is the better policy to 
pursue. However, this is not the place to delve into this particular set of problems. 
36 It  does  seem  to  invite  the  criticism  that  it  entails  the  conclusion  that  one  ought  to  kill  everyone 
painlessly. However, this reductio ad absurdum would not apply to the negative version proposed here of 
Levinas’s notion of infinite responsibility for the Other. 
37 Such deprivations are part of what is meant by poverty in the absolute sense of the term. However, it 
has been argued that poverty is never absolute, always relative – the former makes no sense. For instance, 
if poverty were to be understood in absolute terms only, one might have to conclude that no body (or very 
few people) in the advanced industrial economies today are poor, as the welfare safety net on the whole 
succeeds in preventing the unfortunate from falling into really dire straits. But all the same, such people 
constitute the socially excluded, with no money to buy and run a car, to buy expensive presents for their 
children, etc.; they are said to suffer from relative poverty. It is not part of the remit of this paper to deny 
that the notion of relative poverty has application. However, it does reject the further thesis that the notion 
of absolute poverty is either unintelligible or does not exist in spite of the incontestable fact that absolute 
poverty in the world does exist – millions of poor people die because they cannot afford to buy the food 
to keep alive, of diseases induced by the lack of safe drinking water and/or adequate nutrition as well as 




    Analogously,  Levinas’s  notion  of  responsibility  for  others  may  be  a  given  a 
negative  interpretation.  While  we  definitely  have  a  duty  to  others    (irrespective  of 
kith/kin, nationhood, race/culture/history), nevertheless, we may not have responsibility 
for their happiness, as we do not know what makes people happy (borrowing, for the 
moment, the language of utilitarianism). But all the same we do have a duty to reduce 
their poverty, suffering, their misery, as we know, by and large, what constitutes their 
unhappiness  and  their  pain.
38  In  this  way,  although  one  may  still  have  infinite 
responsibility for others (in the sense that none shall be excluded), the nature of the duty 
is somewhat more circumscribed, and therefore, more do-able.
 When this sense of being 
do-able is added to the other sense of being affordable in economic/financial terms, then 
there should be no inherent obstacle, both intellectual and practical, to discharging that 
responsibility to others.
  
    Levinas’s  emphasis  on  the  suffering  of  others  lends  weight  to  this  suggested 
defence. As we have seen, he is against social exclusion, he talks about the neediness of 
others, the plight of the widow, the orphan, the weak, the sick, all demanding a response 
from us.  
 
 
                                                 
38 In  environmental  philosophy,  the  duty  to  posterity  is  understood  in  these  terms.  Regarding  future 
peoples, we may not know what makes them happy, but we certainly know what would make them 
miserable – lack of clean air, clean  water, unpolluted soil, to name just a few of the conditions the 
absence of which would render human life, if not totally impossible, at least unbearable – see Annette, 
Baier,  “The  Rights  of  Past  and  Future  Persons”,  Ernest  Partridge  (ed),  Responsibilities  to  Future 








I  have  identified  and  distinguished  several  senses  of  Levinas’s  notion  of  infinite 
responsibility. Responsibility is infinite because: 
1.  it  recognises  no  distinction  between  duty  on  the  one  hand  and 
supererogation on the other; 
2.  it does not recognise the distinction between perfect duties on the one 
hand and imperfect duties to others; 
3.  it  is  inclusive,  not  exclusive,  as  it  fails  to  recognise  the  distinction 
between family, kith/kin on the one hand and strangers on the other, 
between insiders (those who share the same history, culture, language, 
ethnicity) on the one hand and outsiders who do not. It urges one to 
recognise the humanity  in the Other, in  all others, not only in some, 
namely, those who are regarded as ‘persons’ in the philosophical sense 
or  kith  and  kin  in  the  sociological  sense.  One  should  be  the  good 
samaritan  and  not  pass  by,  indifferent  to  the  life  or  death,  pain  and 
suffering of  fellow humans;
39 
4.  one  can  distinguish  between  the  positive  and the  negative  senses  of 
responsibility for others. While one concedes that it does not need to be 
understood in the former sense of doing whatever one can to render them 
“happy”, one can, nevertheless, meaningfully discharge that duty in the 
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reduced negative sense of doing what one can to relieve others of suffering 
and poverty, there being a clear consensus as to what constitutes misery. 
As such, Levinas’s notion may be said to be radical as it seems to challenge well-
entrenched  presuppositions  especially  in  the  Kantian  tradition  of  Western  moral 
thought, as well as of so-called common sense morality, which in turn enables one to 
understand why his notion is ignored in general or dismissed out of hand by those like 
Rorty, who care to comment on it, as either inherently absurd and/or impractical. 
      Furthermore,  and  more  importantly,  I  have  attempted  to  argue  that  Levinas 
philosophy can be construed as an attempt to construct a new moral paradigm which, 
contrary to the tradition of modern Western philosophy, follows from his view of ethics 
as first philosophy, based on secular saintliness/holiness, which is a radical departure 
from the dominant strands of moral philosophy, whether Kantian, liberal, or utilitarian. 
      However,  Levinas’s  radical  challenge  inevitably  invites  the  charge  of 
utopianism, and utopianism itself in turn is considered to be inherently absurd, and 
impractical. But is it? Levinas’s brand may just be blazing the moral trail in the twenty 
first century. 